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EDUCATION, GROWTH AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Abstract
When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the Mincerian rate of return
to human capital is negatively related to the supply of human capital. We
work out a simple model for the joint evolution of output and wage dispersion.
We estimate this model using cross-country panel data on GDP and Gini
coefficients. The results are broadly consistent with our hypothesis of
diminishing returns to education. The implied elasticity of substitution fits Katz
and Murphy’s (1992) estimate. A one year increase in the stock of human
capital reduces the rate of return by about 2 per cent. The combination of
imperfect substitution and skill biased technological change closes the gap
between the Mincer equation and GDP growth regressions almost
completely.














If workers with various levels of education were perfect substitutes, relative wages would
be independent of the distribution of human capital. However, studies into the sub-
stitutability of worker types, for example Katz and Murphy (1992), have shown that
this is not the case. Then, a simple economic argument establishes that the Mincerian
rate of return should be negatively related to the average years of education among the
workforce. Raising the average years of education in the economy makes low-skilled
workers more scarce, raising their wages, while at the same time increasing the supply
of highly educated workers, thereby reducing their wages. This mechanism reduces the
return to human capital.
The relation between GDP and education at the aggregate level is a simple re‡ection
of a Mincerian earnings function at the micro level, when externalities of education can
be ignored, as is suggested by a number of recent studies (Heckman and Klenow, 1997;
Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999). This simple theory of imperfect substitution between
workers with di¤erent levels of human capital has joint implications for GDP and income
dispersion. The e¤ect of an increase in the mean level of education on GDP should
decline with the level of education. Hence, we expect a negative second order e¤ect of
increases in the education level on growth. Since wages are the main source of income for
most families, measures of income inequality should be positively related to the return to
education. The average level of education in the economy a¤ects the return to schooling
negatively. Hence, it compresses the wage distribution. The main idea of this paper is
to simultaneously estimate the e¤ect of the average education level on GDP and income
dispersion.
The application of the Mincerian earning function as the driving force in the relation
between GDP and education puts this paper in the extensive stream of research into the
cross country relation between education and growth. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999),
a higher education level makes the labor force more able to deal with technological
innovations, yielding a relation between the level of human capital and the growth of
output. Barro and Sala-i-Martin found indeed that the level of education has a strong
and signi…cant e¤ect on future GDP growth, as did Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) in an
earlier study. The e¤ect of the growth in education on the growth of output, conditional
on the e¤ect of the level of education, is insigni…cant in their regressions. These results
cast doubt on the relevance of the Mincer equation for the aggregate level, increasing
the popularity of human capital based endogenous growth models.
Following Krueger and Lindahl (2000), we argue that these conclusion are due to a
2number of misspeci…cations. Measurement error attenuates the coe¢cient for the growth
in education. However, just Krueger and Lindahl’s argument does not …ll the whole
gap between the Mincer equation and the GDP growth regression. The long run rate of
return to education remains above any reasonable estimate. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger
(1999) show that geography matters for GDP. Proximity to the sea for transport and
a temperate climate to avoid tropical diseases are great advantages to a country. A
combination of …xed e¤ects due to geography, imperfect substitution between types of
labor, and skill biased technological progress brings us much closer to a full reconcilliation
of the GDP data and the Mincer equation. Countries with a favorable geography are
richer and can therefore invest more in human capital. Hence, human capital variables
pick up part of the favorable …xed geography e¤ect. The initial advantage in human
capital increases in the course of time due to skill biased technological progress. This
gives the impression that education yields a higher growth of GDP, not a higher level.
Previous studies on the relation between inequality and growth have focused on the
e¤ect of the one upon the other, some papers arguing that growth reduces inequality
(the so called Kuznets curve), others highlighting the e¤ect of inequality on growth
(see Bénabou 1996 for a survey). Our approach di¤ers from this literature, in that
we take both inequality and growth as dependent variables, simultaneously determined
by the level of human capital. If the average education level has a negative e¤ect on
inequality and a positive e¤ect on growth, as implied by our model, then this provides an
explanation for the negative correlation between inequality and growth that has spurred
this literature.
The theoretical framework we apply is derived from an assignment model with het-
erogeneous workers and heterogeneous jobs, see Teulings (2001). Highly educated work-
ers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs. The return to education is therefore
higher in more complex jobs. When the supply of highly educated workers increases,
there are insu¢cient complex jobs for them. Some high skilled workers have to do less
complex jobs, where their human capital has a lower return. This yields a negative
relation between the aggregate supply of education and its Mincerian rate of return. We
test this relationship by entering a second order term in education in a GDP regression.
Furthermore, education should enter negatively in a regression of the variance of log
wages, since a reduction of the Mincerian rate of return compresses wage di¤erentials.
The simple model we present in the next section formalizes these ideas. We also use our
estimates to derive the compression elasticity: the percentage decline in the return to
human capital per percent increase in the value of its stock. This concept relates our
results to Katz and Murphy’s (1992) estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
3low- and highly skilled workers, providing a check on the interpretation of our estimation
results.
Our empirical work uses Barro and Lee’s (1999) panel data on GDP and education
and Deininger and Squires’ (1996) data on Gini coe¢cients for 100 countries over the
period 1960-1990. Although the micro labor literature has shown that the log-linear
Mincerian wage equation is strikingly robust (see Card 1999 for a survey), the estimated
returns for di¤erent countries vary substantially (Psacharopoulos 1994; Bils and Klenow
1998). This paper exploits this variation to estimate the degree of substitutability
between worker types. We will also present direct evidence of diminishing returns to
education from a cross section of Mincerian rates of return estimated from micro data
for various countries.
Empirical research in this area is troubled by the issue of causality: does a higher
education level lead to higher GDP or is it the other way around. The same problem ap-
plies to the relation between education and income inequality. Indeed, Bils and Klenow
(1998) have argued that the posited causation from education to growth should be re-
versed. However, their arguments apply to the endogenous growth relation, and not to
the Mincerian relation invoked here.1 Our solution to the endogeneity problem relies on
the time-lags in the causation from GDP to average level of schooling of the population.
First, the political system has to decide on spending of additional tax revenues on edu-
cation. Then, new teachers have to be trained and schools have to be built. Only then
the …rst new cohort can undergo the improved training. It will then take some years or
so before the …rst cohort of better educated students enter the labor market. It takes
several new cohorts of better educated workers before there is a noticeable e¤ect on the
average level of education of the workforce. We argue therefore, that it is reasonable to
assume that GDP only a¤ects education level with a lag of at least 10 years. We explore
whether our results are driven by a few countries that experience high growth during
the sample period (e.g. Asian tigers).
Our empirical results provide strong support for a negative relation between the
supply of human capital and its return. Moreover, the estimation results are also largely
mutually consistent quantitatively: a one year increase in the stock of human capital
reduces its return by about 2 percentage points. This estimate is consistent with Katz
and Murphy’s (1992) estimate of the elasticity between low and high skilled workers.
We account for skill biased technological progress by entering cross e¤ects of time
1Bils and Klenow (1999) argue that if endogenous growth is due to the role of education di¤using
the most recent state of technology, then the education of new cohorts should be more valuable, leading
to a negative correlation between growth and the return to experience.
4dummies and education. This relates our analysis to O’Neill (1995). He asks the question
as to why the huge investments in human capital by LDCs have not contributed to a
convergence in GDP between LDCs and the industrialized world. His explanation relies
on skill biased technological progress: “The recent shift in production techniques toward
high-skilled labor has resulted in a substantial increase in the returns to education.
This trend, when combined with the large disparities that still exist in education levels
between the developed and less developed countries, has led to an increase in inequality
despite the signi…cant reduction in the education gap that has occurred over the last 20
years.” (p.1299). Our results con…rm his analysis.
The interaction terms of education and time dummies allow inference on the pace of
skill biased technological change. The GDP and inequality regressions yield quantita-
tively similar estimates, suggesting skill biased technological change to account for a 3%
to 4% increase in the return to education per decade. This is equivalent to the reduction
in the return that would be achieved by a 0.8 year increase in the average level of school-
ing, about as much as the actual increase in the education level over period covered by
our sample. Finally, our analysis reduces the di¤erence between the long and the short
run rate of return to education from a factor 6, as in Krueger and Lindahl (2000), to
less than 2. One can therefore conclude, with some exaggeration, that Tinbergen’s race
(1975) between education and technology and Mincer’s earnings function rule the world.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a simple Walrasian model
with imperfect substitution between types of labor. Section 3 discusses the data and
presents the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 A simple growth model with emphasis on human capital
Consider the long run growth path of an economy with physical and human capital.
All markets are perfectly competitive, so that wages equal marginal productivity. We
specify both a simple aggregate production function and a Mincerian earnings function.
First, consider the Mincerian earnings function. Let wit be the log wage of worker i
at time t and let sit be the years of schooling she attained; wit is assumed to satisfy the
Mincerian earnings function:
wit = !0(St;t) + !1(St;t)sit + ¾uit ´ wt (sit;uit) (1)
where St is the average education level of the workforce in the economy, uit is a mean
zero unit variance random variable representing other characteristics of workers (like
5experience and innate ability) and ¾ is its standard deviation. Both the intercept !0(¢)
and the Mincerian rate of return to human capital !1 (¢) vary over time and with the
average education level of the workforce. Equation (1) is constrained to be linear in sit,
implying that the rate of return to education at particular point in time t is independent
of the years of schooling of an individual worker. This assumption plays an important
role in the subsequent analysis.
Next, consider the aggregate production function. Let output per worker be governed
by a constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas production function:
yt = ®ht + (1 ¡ ®)kt (2)
ht ´ ¯1St ¡ 1
2¯2S2
t + ¯3Stt + ¯4t
where yt is log output per worker, kt log capital per worker and ht is log average pro-
ductivity. We assume St <
¯1
¯2, so that dht
dSt > 0. The …rst term in the expression for ht
measures the e¤ect of schooling. The second term measures the diminishing returns to
education: the higher the mean level of education of the workforce, the smaller the re-
turn to additional schooling. The third term captures the e¤ect of skill biased technical
progress, while the …nal term re‡ects neutral technical progress: other things equal, the
return to education increases over time when ¯3 > 0.
First, consider the role of capital in this economy. Firms maximize pro…ts per worker,
yielding a …rst order condition for the optimal capital stock:
RKt = (1 ¡ ®)Yt ) kt = yt + ln(1 ¡®) ¡ lnr (3)
where Yt and Kt denote the exponentials of the corresponding lower case variables, and
R is the rental rate of capital which we assume to be constant over time. Equation (3)
re‡ects the standard result for a Cobb Douglas technology that the share of capital in
output is equal to 1 ¡ ®. We assume that …rms adjust their capital stock su¢ciently
fast, so that we can ignore deviations from its equilibrium value. Then, combining the
FOC for capital and the production function:
yt = ¯1St ¡ 1
2¯2S2
t +¯4t + ¯3Stt +
1 ¡ ®
®
(ln(1 ¡ ®) ¡ lnr) (4)
kt = ¯1St ¡ 1
2¯2S2
t +¯4t + ¯3Stt +
1
®
(ln(1 ¡ ®) ¡ lnr)
The equations for log output and capital are identical, up to a constant term. Estimation
of the separate contributions of human and physical capital on the basis of equation (2)
is therefore problematic, due to endogeneity of kt. In the absence of measurement
6error in both St and kt, equation (2) is unidenti…ed since ¯1St ¡ 1
2¯2S2
t + ¯4t + ¯3Stt
is collinear with kt. In the presence of measurement error, the relative magnitudes
of their coe¢cients merely re‡ects the precision of their measurement. Krueger and
Lindahl (2000) argue that capital data are correlated to output by construction, since
investment data …gure in both series. Hence, measurement error in both series are likely
to be correlated. This explains why they …nd 1 ¡ ® to be much higher than one would
expect on the basis of capital’s share in output (about 0.35). We shall therefore omit
capital from all our regressions and report estimation results for equation (4) only.
Next, consider the role of types of labor in this economy. We have a similar condition
for labor as for capital, aggregating over all individuals:
®Yt =
Z Z
Wt (s;u)ft (s;u)dsdu (5)
where ft (s;u) is the joint cross-sectional density of s and u, and Wt(s;u) ´ exp(wt (s;u))
is the wage rate of an individual with s years of schooling and characteristics u. Labor
gets a share ® of total output.
Marginal productivity theory implies that the increase in output from adding one
worker with characteristics (s;u) to the workforce of this economy raises output by
Wt (s;u). This implication extends to the (marginal) e¤ect of new human capital: a






= Wt (sit;uit)!1 (St;t) (6)
where Yt denotes aggregate output, and Wt (sit;uit) is given by the Mincer equation (1).
Equation (6) states that the increase in output due to an increase in the schooling level
of worker i by an amount h, equals the gain in output due to the addition of a worker
with characteristics (s +h;u) minus the loss in output due to the removal of a worker
with characteristics (s;u).
Consider an increase of the years of education of all workers by an equal amount
dsit = ds for all i. By construction, the average years of education St changes by that
same amount: dSt = ds, thus shifting the marginal distribution of education to the right.
Then, each worker’s wage increases by an amount
@Wt(sit;uit)
@sit ds = Wt (sit;uit)!1(St;t)ds.
The change in total output is obtained from the production function (2):
@Yt
@St
ds = (¯1 ¡ ¯2St + ¯3t)®Ytds
7By equation (6), the e¤ect of this increase in St on aggregate output is equal to the sum












where the third equality follows from equation (5). The second line relies on the linearity
of the Mincerian earnings function (1) in sit, for otherwise !1 (St;t) could not be brought
outside the integral.
Dividing through by the labor share, we obtain an expression for the return to
education:
!1 (St;t) = ¯1 ¡ ¯2St +¯3t (7)
The increase in log aggregate output is equal to Mincerian rate of return to education.
Or, in other words, the private return to education, as measured in a cross section
analysis on individual wages, is equal to the social rate of return, as measured in a time
series analysis of log aggregate output. This conclusion does not come as a surprise,
since in this Walrasian world, there are no external e¤ects of schooling decisions.
The return to education !1(¢) determines relative wages of workers with various
levels of education. If ¯2 were 0, then the relative wages would be independent of
St and workers with di¤erent levels of education would be perfect substitutes. With
¯2 > 0, an increase in the mean level of education in the economy reduces the rate of
return to education. Teulings (2001) provides a production technology that yields this
implication.2
2.2 Inequality and the compression elasticity
An increase in the level of education reduces the return on further investments in human
capital by ¯2dSt. This fall in the return on human capital compresses wage di¤eren-
tials. We use this relation to analyze the interaction between the evolution of output
and income dispersion Dt. For simplicity, capital income is assumed to be distributed
2Because we do not need an expression for !0 (St;t) for our empirical application, it is not presented
here. However, the declining marginal return to education implies that a below average educated worker
gains from an increase in the mean level of human capital, whereas an above average worker looses out
(in both cases, keeping constant the human capital of that worker).
8proportional to labor income, so that the log wage distribution and the log income
distribution di¤er only by their …rst moment. We assume that sit and uit are jointly
normally distributed, with correlation ½. Furthermore, we assume that the variance of
sit is constant over time V (sit) = V .3 We can then derive an expression for the variance
of log income Dt = V (wit) from the Mincer equation (1).
Dt = !1 (St;t)
2 V + 2!1 (St;t)V 1=2¾½ + ¾2
= µ0t ¡ µ1tSt + µ2S2
t (8)
where
µ0t = (¯1 + ¯3t)
2 V + 2(¯1 + ¯3t)V 1=2¾½ + ¾2
µ1t = 2¯2 (¯1 + ¯3t)V + 2¯2V 1=2¾½
µ2 = ¯2
2V
The variation in income due to the education component is equal to the variance of
years of education, multiplied by the return to education. The second equality follows
from substitution of equation (7). Equation (8) establishes cross equation restrictions
on the equations for output and income dispersion. When information on ½;¾ and V is
available, these restrictions can be tested. Notice that if ¯2 = 0, Dt would not depend
on St.
The coe¢cient ¯2 relates in a simple way to earlier empirical …ndings, like Katz
and Murphy’s (1992) estimate of the substitution elasticity between low- and high-
skilled workers of 1.4. For this purpose, we de…ne the compression elasticity ° as the
percentage reduction in the return to human capital per percent increase in the value
of its stock. This elasticity can be calculated from equations (1) and (2) as the relative
reduction of the return to human capital per year increase in St, divided by the e¤ect
of this increase in the level of schooling on the log value of the stock of human capital:








(¯1 ¡ ¯2St + ¯3t)
2 (9)
Equation (9) implies that the compression elasticity is increasing in St. This im-
plication is imposed by the quadratic speci…cation for ht adopted in equation (2) and
3This is a crucial assumption for the analysis. If V varies over time, the linear form of Mincerian
equation (1) would collapse, see Teulings (2001) for details. An increase in V raises labor supply in both
tails of the schooling distribution. This reduces relative wages in the tails. In the empirical sections, we
shall adopt a pragmatic approach, by including Vt as an additive control variable in our regressions.
9should not be taken at face value. However, Teulings (2001) shows that the compres-
sion elasticity is indeed increasing in the level of human capital in the special case of a
Leontief production technology over di¤erent types of labor.4
The compression elasticity relates to the Katz and Murphy elasticity of substitution





Using Katz and Murphy’s (1992) estimate of ´low-high = 1:4 and using a typical value
for wage dispersion in the United States of Dt » = 0:36, the compression elasticity is of
the order of magnitude of 2 for the United States. We will use equations (9) and (10)
to compare Katz and Murphy’s estimate to our estimation results.
2.3 Why linearity of the Mincer equation is important
The interpretation of the second order e¤ect of years of education on GDP as being
caused by imperfect substitutability of worker types relies on the linearity of the Mincer
equation in sit. In the subsequent argument, we ignore technological progress and assume
uit and sit to be uncorrelated for convenience. Suppose that workers with various levels
of schooling are perfect substitutes (so !0 and !1 do not depend on St), but that the
Mincerian earnings function (1) is concave in the years of education:
wit = wt (sit;uit) = !0 + !1sit ¡ 1
2!2s2
it + ¾uit (11)








(¯1 ¡ ¯2St)®Yt =
Z Z
(!1 ¡ !2s)Wt (s;u)ft (s;u)dsdu
In appendix A we show that the integral has an analytic solution, and the above expres-
sion can be written as:










4In that case, the compression elasticity satis…es (dropping the time dependence for convenience)
° (S) = ° (0)exp[° (0)!1 (0)S]




This expression yields an alternative interpretation for ¯2 > 0. Instead of imperfect
substitution between types of labor, the negative second order e¤ect of education on
output is now interpreted as declining marginal returns to human capital for each in-
dividual worker. In this case the aggregate return to human capital also declines when
the human capital stock increases since every worker moves along its schedule of de-
clining marginal returns. We can derive an equation for income inequality Dt for this
interpretation which is observationally equivalent to equation (8). Again, this yields an
alternative interpretation of a negative e¤ect of St on income inequality. In fact, any
combination of concavity of the Mincerian earnings function and imperfection in the
substitutability of worker types can explain ¯2 > 0. Data on output and the variance of
log income alone do allow to disentangle both models. However, as observed by Krueger
and Lindahl (2000), the abundant empirical evidence on the Mincerian earnings function
does not suggest any systematic non-linearities in the relation between log wages and
years of schooling. We shall therefore interpret the second order e¤ect in the log output
equation as evidence that di¤erent types of labor are imperfect substitutes.
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Data sources
Our empirical analysis is largely based on data from two sources: the Barro and Lee
(1996, 1993) data on educational attainment and the Deininger and Squire (1996) data
on income inequality. These datasets were supplemented with data on real GDP per
worker from the Penn World Table (Summers and Heston 1991) mark 5.6a.
The Barro and Lee dataset contains detailed data on educational attainment for 114
countries for the period 1960-1990 in intervals of 5 years. Barro and Lee report the
fraction of the population that attained a certain education level, as well as the average
duration of this education level. They use these data to construct the average education
level of the population in years. We also calculate a rough estimate of the variance of
the education distribution.5
5Barro and Lee calculate average years of education from attainment data (percentage of the pop-
ulation that have attained a certain level of schooling) combined with data on the typical duration of
11Deininger and Squire (1996) use results from a large number of studies and assess
their comparability. Their dataset contains Gini coe¢cients of the income distribution
for 115 countries from 1947 to 1996. We use only the ‘high quality’ data for the pe-
riod 1960-1990. The ‘high quality’ label is provided by Deininger and Squire on the
basis of three criteria: data are (i) based on a national household survey, (ii) which
is representative of the population, and (iii) in which all sources of income have been
counted. The total number of observations in the high quality sample is 693. The data
contain missing values due to limitations to the time period of data availability, and
due to missing observations within that time period. For virtually all countries, data
are available only every two or …ve years or at irregular intervals. We construct data
for 5 year intervals from 1960 to 1995 by linear inter- and extrapolation.6 This method
yields a dataset containing 370 observations for 98 countries. Only for 58 countries we
have three or more observations. We calculated the variance of log income from the
Gini coe¢cients, assuming that log income is distributed normally. The details of this
calculation can be found in appendix B.
Table 1 summarizes the main variables in the combined dataset.7
3.2 Direct estimates of diminishing returns to education
Before presenting the estimation results for our main dataset, we present some estimates
of the e¤ect of the mean years of schooling on the return to human capital as measured
directly from individual data. In table 2 we have ranked a large number of countries
each level of schooling (1996, p.218). We can express the calculation as:
S = fpriSpri + fsec (Dpri + Ssec) + fhigh (Dpri + Dsec + Shigh)
where S is average years of schooling in the total population, flevel is the fraction of the population
that has attained a certain education level (no education, primary education, secondary education or
higher education), Dlevel is the typical duration of the di¤erent education levels, and Slevel is the average
duration of a certain education level for those people that have not continued to attain a higher education
level. Intuitively Slevel < Dlevel due to early drop-out.
The calculation of average years of schooling in this expression is just an expected value, which suggests
the following proxy for the variance in education within each country (cf. Checchi 1999):
V (S) = fpriS
2
pri + fsec (Dpri + Ssec)
2 + fhigh (Dpri + Dsec + Shigh)
2 ¡ S
2
6For interpolation we use b xt = n
n+pxt¡p+
p
n+pxt+n, where n is the time span till the next observations
and p · 2 is the time span since the previous observation. For extrapolation we use the observation that
is closest by. This procedure is e¢cient if the Gini follows a random walk, as is almost true empirically.
7The data are available at http://www.princeton.edu/~tvanrens/paper.
12for which such estimates of the return to schooling are available. The data are obtained
from Bils and Klenow (1998) and include estimates from Psacharopoulos (1994) and
other authors (sources in the table). We have plotted the return to education against
the average schooling level in …gure 1, panel A. Apart from Jamaica, there is a clear
negative relationship between the two. The return to education is plotted against income
inequality in Panel B. This relation documents that inequality is indeed strongly related
to the return to education.
Table 3 presents the results for some simple regressions on these data. Obviously,
these estimates should be interpreted with some care. The data in table 3 provide
the best estimates that are available for many countries, but it is not clear to which
extend these estimates are comparable across countries. In particular, the underlying
studies di¤er in whether and how they account for ability bias and measurement error.
Nevertheless, the estimates are informative. They show that the return to education is
about 16% for countries with an education level of zero, and decreases by about 0.7%
for every year of education. For the average education level of 5.3 years in our sample,
this would correspond to a return to schooling of 12%. In the US, with an average
education level of 12 years of schooling in 1990, the return to education would be about
7.5%. This simple cross section analysis provides therefore …rst evidence of the negative
relation between the return to education and the mean years of schooling in the economy.
The time dummies suggest that there has been skill biased technological progress from
1985 to 1990, raising the return to human capital by 4%. However, there is little action
before 1985. The estimation results even suggest a negative skill bias in that period,
but the results are insigni…cant. Weighting countries by log GDP per worker or log
population size does not a¤ect these conclusions.
3.3 Estimation results for GDP
We apply an error correction version of equation (4) for output as a starting point for our
empirical analysis. We replace the time trends in skill biased and neutral technological
progress by dummies to allow for variations in their pace. Indexing countries by j, the
equation we estimate is:










= ¡±yjt¡1 + °0t + °1t¢Sjt + °2¢S2
jt + °3tSjt¡1 + °4S2
jt¡1 + vjt
13where vt is an error term. The short run return to human capital is °1t+2°2Sjt¡1, while
the long run return is (°3t + 2°4Sjt¡1)=±. Krueger and Lindahl (2000) have shown that
estimates of the return to human capital from this type of model are strongly a¤ected by
attenuation bias because of measurement error when using short time intervals. How-
ever, the longer the time interval, the greater the risk of reverse causality. As argued
in the introduction, we take it to be unlikely that shocks to GDP have a major impact
on the mean level education within 10 years. Hence, we apply a 10 year observation
interval. This implies that we have at most 3 observations on the change in education
for each country, 1960 till 1990.
Estimation results for equation (13) are reported in Table 4. Column (1) replicates
Krueger and Lindahl (2000, Table 3). The results di¤er slightly because we use GDP
per worker rather than GDP per capita. The short run e¤ect of 8% additional GDP per
year education is roughly consistent with the micro literature on the Mincerian earnings
function. The long run e¤ect takes a long time to materialize, as can be seen from
the low coe¢cient of the level of GDP lagged. However, the long run e¤ect is 6 times
larger than the short run e¤ect (0.00297/0.00616 = 48 log points increase in GDP per
additional year of education), exceeding by far any estimate of the Mincerian rate of
return.
Column (2) of Table 4 adds the crucial second order e¤ect in education. Its coe¢cient
has the expected negative sign and is signi…cant at the 5% level. The second order term
is about 1/20 of the …rst order term, both for the short and the long run terms. This
ratio of one over 20 will be a recurrent theme in all our estimates. This regression implies
a return to education in the range of -1.7% to 10% for an average education level of 12
to 4 years. When we allow for skill biased technological change as in column (3) the
coe¢cient °1 seems to increase substantially, but this is because the reference category
for the time dummy interactions is 1990. Although the short run cross-e¤ects of time
dummies and education are not very precisely measured, they provide some information
regarding the nature of technological progress. Their negative sign is evidence of skill
biased technological progress: keeping constant the average education level, the return
to education has gone up over the period. The pace of skill biased technological progress
increased dramatically during the eighties, raising the return by as much as 6.7%. To
get some idea about the size of the impact of skill biased technological progress, we can
use the second order term for education to calculate the increase in average years of
education that is required to o¤set this increase: 0:067
2¤0:0085 = 4 years. The e¤ect of skill
biased technological progress on the return to schooling in the eighties (one decade) was
about twice as high as the e¤ect of the increase in the average education level over the
14whole sample period (three decades). The long run coe¢cients yield a similar picture.
Note however that the long run return to education is still 6 times higher than the short
run return.
We report some speci…cation tests in columns (4) through (6). Column (4) adds
the variance in the years of education. This does not a¤ect the results. In columns
(5) and (6) observations are weighted by log GDP per worker and log population size
respectively. Again, this does not make much di¤erence. The WLS estimates show that
our results are not driven by a few very poor or very small countries, and are consistent
with tests that show that there is no heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
We also estimated the model with random and …xed e¤ects. These regressions
strongly suggest the presence of country speci…c …xed e¤ects. This does not come as a
surprise. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) have shown the importance of geography
for growth and GDP. Access to open sea or navigable rivers is an important advantage.
Countries with a temperate climate do much better than countries in the tropical zone.
The authors present evidence that the e¤ect of climate is likely to be due to tropical
diseases, in particular malaria. Where these factors are largely …xed (there is some re-
duction in the number of countries where malaria is endemic), we should allow for …xed
e¤ects in our estimation.
OLS estimation of equation (13) is inconsistent in the presence of …xed e¤ects as yt¡1
is correlated with the …xed e¤ect. Also, OLS in …rst di¤erences would be inconsistent
because of the lagged dependent variable. We therefore use the methodology set out in
Blundell and Bond (1998). We respecify equation (13) as:
yjt = °0t + (1 ¡ ±)yjt¡1 + °1tSjt ¡ (°1t ¡°3t)Sjt¡1
+°2S2
jt ¡ (°2 ¡ °4)S2
jt¡1 + fj + "jt (14)
where we assume:
E ["jtfj] = 0
E ["jt"jt¡s] = 0 for s 6= 0
E ["jtSjt¡s] = 0 for s ¸ 0
The third assumption re‡ects our identifying assumptions that shocks "jt in log GDP
take at least ten years to have a signi…cant e¤ect on St. The e¢cient GMM estimator
of equation (14) uses the following moment conditions (Arellano and Bond 1991)
E [¢"jtyjt¡s] = 0 for s ¸ 2
E [¢"jtSjt¡s] = 0 for s ¸ 1
15which follow directly from our assumptions on the error term above. We estimated this
model using the DPD98 for Gauss package (Arellano and Bond 1998). Table 5 gives the
estimation results. Column (1) is identical to column (3) in table 4, but now presented
in levels as in equation (14). Column (2) repeats column (1) in …rst di¤erences. Both
estimators are inconsistent. Column (3) presents the GMM estimation results using the
above moment conditions. The results are insigni…cant, as was to be expected given the
small number of observations and short time dimension of our data.
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest jointly estimating equation (14) in …rst di¤erences
and in levels. This results in an e¢ciency gain, particularly in panels with a short time
dimension, because the estimator uses additional moment conditions. We have to make
one additional assumption:
E [fj¢Sjt] = 0
Then, two additional moment conditions are available:
E [(fj + "jt)¢yjt¡s] = 0 for s ¸ 1
E [(fj + "jt)¢Sjt¡s] = 0 for s ¸ 0
Columns (4) and (5) present the estimation results using all moment conditions, where
we use a two step procedure to account for the covariance structure in the error terms
in column (5). We take column (5) as the benchmark for our discussion. The Sargan
test-statistic for the validity of instruments is 12.65 with 12 degrees of freedom (p-value
is 39.5%), accepting the over-identifying restrictions. The ratio of the …rst and second
order term of St is still about 20, both for the contemporaneous and the lagged e¤ect.
However, the long run e¤ect is now much closer to the short run e¤ect than in Table 4:
the short run e¤ect of the …rst order term is 0:46 and the long run e¤ect 0:46¡0:13
1¡0:63 = 0:89,
less than 2 times the short run return. This is as close as our analysis will bring us to the
Mincerian wage equation. Finally, there is clear evidence of skill biased technological
progress, raising the return to education by about 4.5% during the eighties and about
3.5% during the nineties (keeping constant the mean level of education).
The estimate for the diminishing returns to education ¯2 = 2°2 = ¡0:048 is about 7
times higher than the direct estimate in table 3. The combination of allowing for …xed
e¤ects and skill biased technological change is crucial for this result. There is a clear
intuition for this. Geography gives some nations an initial advantage over others. These
countries can a¤ord a higher level of investment in human capital, raising their level of
St. Hence, St is correlated with the …xed e¤ect and is likely to pick up some of the e¤ects
16of geography in a regression without …xed e¤ects. Next, countries with a high level of St
see their initial advantage increased by skill biased technological progress. When we do
not allow for this type of technological progress by including time dummies crossed with
St, this e¤ect shows up as endogenous growth due to a high initial level of education.
A combination of Tinbergen’s race between education and technology, Mincer’s return
to human capital and Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger’s geography gives therefore a …ne
description of the evolution of GDP between 1960 and 1990.
The returns to education by decade, evaluated at the average education level across
countries in our sample are as follows.
1970 1980 1990
Average education level St 3.83 4.56 5.32
Return to Education 19.9% 20.8% 20.6%
Notice that the numbers are not strictly comparable over time because some countries do
not have data on education for the whole sample period. The number for 1980 is about
twice times Krueger and Lindahl’s estimate of 8.5%. However, the return is much lower
in the OECD countries. It is even negative for the country with the highest education
level, the United States (St = 12 in 1990).8 A 0.8 year increase in the mean value of St
during eighties su¢ces to o¤set the e¤ect of skill biased technological progress, which
seems to be a more realistic number than the 4 years calculated on the basis of table 3.
The race between education and technology has no clear winner: the upward e¤ect of
technology is o¤set by the increase in the average education level across the world.
From equation (9) we can calculate the compression elasticity evaluated at the aver-
age education level in 1990 using the estimates of column (5): ° (5:3;1990) = 1:14. This
is lower than the value of 2 implied by Katz and Murphy’s (1992) estimate of the elas-
ticity of substitution between highly and low-skilled workers. However, their estimate
applies to the United States. We cannot calculate the complexity dispersion parameter
for the United States due to its estimated negative rate of return to human capital, but
theory suggests that the complexity dispersion parameter is increasing in St, see the
discussion in Section 2.2. Hence, our estimation results are reasonably consistent with
Katz and Murphy’s elasticity of substitution.
As pointed out by Krueger and Lindahl (2000), a shorter observation period exacer-
bates the consequences of measurement error in ¢St. In table 6 we report the estimation
8One expects this result to be due to the restricted functional form of the model, using only a quadratic
in education. We tried including a third order term, but the data contain insu¢cient variation to allow
reliable estimation.
17results for Krueger and Lindahl’s speci…cation and for our baseline regression (table 4,
column 3) using 5, 10 and 20 year changes. Reading the table horizontally, we see that





increase as we use longer time intervals.
From column (1) to column (3) the number of observations drops from 607 to 292.
Nevertheless the signi…cance of the parameter estimates increases substantially. The
long run coe¢cients do not change much. Moving from a 10 to a 20 year observation
period raises the coe¢cients even further, though not by far as much as in Krueger and
Lindahl’s speci…cation. This result is problematic for the conclusions of Krueger and
Lindahl. Measurement error provides a justi…cation for using long time intervals, but
there is no clear rule as to how long the interval should be. Whereas the long run return
is 6 times higher than the short run return when measured by using 10 year intervals,
one can increase the estimate of the short run return to almost any level by using longer
and longer time di¤erence intervals. Therefore, the smaller di¤erence between long and
short run return and the lower sensitivity of the estimation results to the di¤erencing
interval applied, makes one feel more comfortable about the interpretation of the results.
Columns (7) and (8) repeat the estimations for 20 year time interval with the Kyriacou
(1991) data for education. The results are largely similar to the Barro and Lee education
data.
Table 7 presents a robustness check. Our results might be driven by a few countries
with exceptionally high growth rates and exceptionally high investment in human capi-
tal, both persisting over the whole 30 year period covered. This would open a channel
for reverse causality by the following story: some countries grow fast over prolonged pe-
riod, and use their additional revenues to invest in education. In that case, the increase
in the average level of education in this observation period is just a predictor of the
raise in education during the previous observation period. Hence, we exclude …rst the
10 highest and lowest observations on ¢yt;¢St;yt and St in a number of regressions.
Obviously, this compression of the variation in the data reduces the signi…cance of the
coe¢cients. However, the crucial coe¢cient °2 never changes sign and is quite stable.
3.4 Estimation results for inequality
As starting point, we estimate an extended version of equation (8):
Djt = µ0t + µ1tSjt + µ2S2
jt + µ3Vjt + "jt (15)
where we added Vjt as a control variable as discussed in section 2.2. Again, we use a
ten year observation period. The data on income inequality are less comparable across
18countries than the data on GDP growth and education level. In particular, the Gini
coe¢cients in the Deininger and Squire dataset are based on di¤erent de…nitions: some
use income and others expenditure data, some are based on the household as a reference
unit and others on the individual, some are based on gross and others on net income. As
suggested by Deininger and Squire (1996) we include dummy variables in the regressions
to control for changes in the de…nition of the income variable.
The OLS estimation results for equation (15) are reported in table 8. Columns (1)
to (3) present results for the model in levels. Column (1) presents the full model. The
main variables St and S2
t have the expected sign, though the latter is not signi…cant.
Note however, that just the signi…cance of µ1t is su¢cient evidence for ¯2 > 0, since
neither St nor S2
t would have any e¤ect on income dispersion if ¯2 = 0. If the correlation
½ between uit and sit were zero, the model would imply that the …rst and second order
e¤ects in this regression di¤er by the same ratio as the …rst and second order e¤ects in





°1t, see equation (8). In our estimates of the GDP
equation we found a rather robust ratio of one over 20 between the second and …rst order
e¤ects. In column (1), this ratio is much lower. This would be consistent with a positive
correlation between years of schooling and other worker characteristics, ½ > 0, but due
to the lack of precision in the measurement of µ2, we cannot draw strong conclusions.
This is documented by the results in column (2): dropping the time variation in µ1t
raises µ2 by a factor 2. We take column (2) as a benchmark.
Testing cross equation restrictions between (8) and (13) requires information on V;½;
and ¾. An estimate for V can be found in table 1: V » = 12:6. Since we do not have a
reliable estimate for ½, the subsequent calculations are based on ½ = 0.9 The estimation
results in column (5) of table 5 for 1990 imply:




The estimated values for µ1t in column (2) of table 8 are a factor 7 smaller than what
one would expect on the basis of estimate of the GDP growth equation. The estimate
for µ2 is a factor 18 too small.
9This provides a lower bound on the e¤ect of education on wage dispersion
µ1t = 2¯2 (¯1 + ¯3t)V + 2¯2V
1=2¾½ = 2¯2
³




An upper bound can be found by setting ½ = 1 and ¾
2 equal to the total variance of log wages:
¾ = D
1=2
t ' 0:75 from table 1. In that case V
¡1=2¾½ = 0:21, about half the size of ¯1 + ¯3t which is
between 0.38 and 0.46, see Table 5. Hence, setting ½ = 0 will not greatly a¤ect the conclusions in the
text.
19Two remarks are in place here. First, the estimates for µ1 and µ2 (in absolute value)
are positively correlated: a low estimate for µ1 generates a low estimate for µ2 as well.
Constraining the ratio between the …rst and second order e¤ect to 20, the estimate goes
up to µ1 = ¡0:15 (t¡value: 9:39), reducing the di¤erence with its expected value on the
basis of the GDP model to a factor 4.
Second, in the derivation of equation (8) we assumed that capital income is dis-
tributed proportionally to labor income. This assumption is clearly incorrect. Since
capital income accounts for a large share on income inequality and since inequality is
unrelated to the return to human capital, the empirical e¤ect of St on inequality can be
expected to be smaller than predicted by equation (8).
The proxy for the variance of the schooling distribution that we include as a control
variable in the regressions is insigni…cant. This suggests that the direct e¤ect of schooling
on the income distribution (a more homogeneous human capital distribution leads to
less income dispersion) is less important than the indirect, general equilibrium e¤ect
(a higher average education level reduces the return to human capital and therefore
compresses the income distribution). However, since we only have a crude proxy for the
variance of education, we may expect its coe¢cient to be attenuated towards zero. In
any case its inclusion does not a¤ect the other coe¢cient estimates.
Column (3) enters …xed e¤ects as a robustness check. Though the sign of the coe¢-
cients remains consistent with the model, they are no longer signi…cant. An alternative
way to eliminate country speci…c e¤ects is by …rst di¤erencing equation (15). Estima-
tion results for this model are presented in columns (4) trough (7). Column (4) presents
the results when both St and S2
t are included. Both µ1t and µ2 are insigni…cant, but
have the expected sign. Column (5) presents the most robust test of the model: testing
¯2 > 0 by entering only St while allowing for …xed country e¤ects by …rst di¤erencing.
The coe¢cient for St is signi…cant.
The positive and signi…cant intercept documents a rising trend in income inequality,
keeping education constant. This trend can be explained by the e¤ect of skill biased
technological progress. Using the results in column (5) we can evaluate the size of this
e¤ect. From equation (8) we have
@Dt=@St
@Dt=@t = ¯2=¯3 (again setting ½ = 0). Hence, we can
estimate ¯2=¯3 as the ratio of the coe¢cient for ¢St and the constant term, yielding
¯2=¯3 = 5:6. From the GDP regression in table 5, column (5) we can retrieve ¯2=¯3 as





divided by estimate for skill biased technological progress,
that is, 3.5 % per decade. Hence ¯2=¯3 = 1:4. Based on the estimates for GDP one
would have expected a four times higher intercept in the inequality regression. This
calculation indicates that there are other factors compressing inequality, which o¤set
20the e¤ect of skill biased technological progress.
Columns (6) and (7) present results when we weigh observations by log GDP per
worker and log population size. Like in the GDP growth equation, this does not make
a lot of di¤erence. We present a …nal robustness check in column (8). As pointed out
by Atkinson and Brandolini (1999), additive dummy variables may be insu¢cient to
control for changes in de…nitions of the Gini coe¢cient. We therefore dummied all 21
observations with a de…nitional change separately. This correction is clearly asking too
much from the data (the number of observations is only 77), and all coe¢cient estimates
become insigni…cant, though the coe¢cient for ¢St still has the expected sign.
3.5 Inequality and growth
The positive e¤ect of education on GDP and its negative e¤ect on inequality imply
a negative correlation between inequality and GDP. We estimated the global average
return to education at around 21%, and the e¤ect of education on the variance of the log
income distribution at around -8% (evaluated at the average education level St = 4:56
in 1980). These estimates imply a correlation between GDP and the variance of log
wages of
Corr(yjt;Djt) =




where we used the variance of the average education level across countries and time, and
the standard deviations of yjt and Djt from table 1. The observed correlation between
yjt and Djt in our sample is ¡0:20, and the correlation between ¢yjt and ¢Djt is ¡0:29.
Most of the existing literature has focused on the relation between inequality and
GDP growth (see Bénabou 1996 for a survey). However, since GDP growth is correlated
with the level of GDP (correlation coe¢cient 0.24), the negative correlation between
¢yjt and Djt (correlation is ¡0:13) that has spurred this literature, may very well be
due to the negative correlation between yjt and Djt caused by education and possible
other third factors. Instead, the literature has focused on a causal relation between
inequality and growth, an approach that has recently been questioned by Quah (2001).
Quah argues that because most of the variation in inequality is across countries and most
of the variation in growth is across time, it is unlikely that inequality has an empirically
relevant e¤ect on growth. Our results o¤er support for this argument. Modelling GDP
and inequality as being jointly determined by education implies an even larger negative
correlation than is observed in the data. This approach seems more promising than
looking for a causal relation between inequality and growth or vice versa.
214 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the evolution of GDP, the Gini coe¢cient and the rate of return
to education can be captured by a simple Walrasian model of imperfect substitution
between workers with various levels of education in the presence of skill-biased techno-
logical progress. Human capital enters as a factor of production in this simple constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas economy. We derived easy to interpret relations between
educational attainment, GDP and income inequality that can be estimated from cross-
country panel data.
Our empirical results provide strong support for the negative relation between the
supply of human capital and its return. The implied return to schooling in di¤erent
countries is well in line with evidence from micro data. Our estimates provide a simple
explanation for the negative correlation between inequality and growth based on the
comovement of these variables with the average education level. Our results suggest
that this mechanism is quantitatively more important than a causal relationship between
inequality and growth.
A Non-linear Mincer equation
To get expression (12) in the text, we …rst used the assumption that sit and uit are
uncorrelated to integrate out over u
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Second, notice that since ft (s) is the pdf of a normal (with mean St and variance V ),
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denote income with density f (W), distribution function F(W) and
mean M. F(W) measures the share of the population with income lower than W. Let
Z (W) denote the cumulative share of total income earned by people with income lower







The graph of the Lorenz curve has F (W) on the horizontal and Z (W) on the vertical
axis. The Gini coe¢cient G 2 [0;1] is given by twice the area between the Lorentz curve
and the 45-degree line.







By change of variables, using dZ = 1
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, where w ´ lnW and ¹ and ¾2 are the mean and variance of w. By change of
variables v =
w¡¹






















which maps the Gini coe¢cient to the variance of the log income distribution ¾2. Nu-
merically evaluating this expression for di¤erent values of ¾ shows that the relationship
is virtually linear in the relevant range. Variances of log income of 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and
0.4 correspond to Gini coe¢cients of 52.05, 56.33, 60.39, 64.20 and 67.78 respectively.
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26Table 1. Description of the main variables in the dataset
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Description and source
yt 1060 8.611 1.037 6.122 11.172 Log real GDP per worker, 1985 intl. prices, Chain
index (PWT 5.6a).
t y D 429 0.021 0.027 -0.066 0.101 10 year changes in real GDP per worker.
(annualized)
Dt 370 0.560 0.319 0.100 1.552 Variance of log income. Calculated from Gini
coefficient income distribution (Deininger and Squire).
t D D 92 0.000 0.017 -0.052 0.051 10 year changes in variance of income.
(annualized)
St 775 4.240 2.848 0.040 12.000 Average years of education attained by the population
over 25 years of age (Barro and Lee).
t S D 328 0.066 0.066 -0.225 0.387 10 year changes in average years of education.
(annualized)
Vt 662 12.657 5.834 1.043 35.823 Variance of the education distribution (rough estimate
constructed on the basis of Barro and Lee data).
t V D 273 0.249 0.297 -0.888 1.361 10 year changes in variance of education.
(annualized)Table 2. Return to education in several countries
Average years of schooling
population over 25
Return to Education PWT 5.0
country
code Country year educ. level year ret. to educ
123 Poland POL 85 8.7 86 .024
126 Sweden SWE 80 9.45 81 .026
114 Greece GRC 85 6.89 85 .027
118 Italy ITA 85 5.75 87 .028
107 Austria AUT 85 7.17 87 .039
115 Hungary HUN 85 7.93 87 .039
50 Canada CAN 80 10.23 81 .042
83 China CHN 85 4.04 85 .045
110 Denmark DNK 90 11.21 90 .047
89 Israel ISR 80 9.11 79 .057
85 India IND 80 2.72 81 .062
131 Australia AUS 80 10.02 82 .064
121 Netherlands NLD 85 8.29 83 .066
41 Tanzania TZA 80 . 80 .067
127 Switzerland CHE 85 8.99 87 .072
68 Bolivia BOL 90 4.11 89 .073
113 Germany West DEU 90 8.83 88 .077
53 Dom. Rep. DOM 90 3.76 89 .078
117 Ireland IRL 85 7.87 87 .079
78 Venezuela VEN 90 4.89 89 .084
75 Peru PER 90 5.5 90 .085
21 Kenya KEN 80 2.46 80 .085
77 Uruguay URY 90 6.69 89 .09
104 Thailand THA 70 3.54 71 .091
66 USA USA 90 12 89 .093
94 Malaysia MYS 80 4.49 79 .094
124 Portugal PRT 85 3.45 85 .094
29 Morocco MAR 70 . 70 .095
54 El Salvador SLV 90 3.4 90 .096
129 UK GBR 70 7.66 72 .097
97 Pakistan PAK 80 1.74 79 .097
61 Nicaragua NIC 80 2.83 78 .097
109 Cyprus CYP 85 7.56 84 .098
72 Ecuador ECU 85 5.36 87 .098
74 Paraguay PRY 90 4.72 89 .103
51 Costa Rica CRI 90 5.4 89 .105
92 Korea KOR 85 8.03 86 .106
67 Argentina ARG 90 7.77 89 .107
100 Singapore SGP 75 4.38 74 .113
98 Philippines PHL 90 6.73 88 .119
70 Chile CHL 90 6.16 89 .121
4 Botswana BWA 80 2.29 79 .126
62 Panama PAN 90 7.55 89 .126
125 Spain ESP 90 6.25 90 .13
60 Mexico MEX 85 4.34 84 .141
56 Guatemala GTM 90 2.56 89 .142
71 Colombia COL 90 4.25 89 .145
69 Brazil BRA 90 3.56 89 .154
86 Indonesia IDN 80 3.09 81 .17
58 Honduras HND 90 3.68 89 .172
20 Cote d'Ivoire CIV 85 . 85 .207
59 Jamaica JAM 90 4.51 89 .28
Education data from Barro and Lee. Return to education data from Bils and Klenow (1998).
Original sources return to education: Rosholm and Smith 1996 (Denmark), Calan and Reilly 1993 (Ireland),
Armitage and Sabot 1987 (Kenya and Tanzania), Alba-Ramirez and San Segundo 1995 (Spain), Arai 1994
(Sweden),  Chiswick 1977 (Thailand), Krueger and Pischke 1992 (USA and Germany) and Psacharopoulos 1994
(all other countries); see Bils and Klenow for full references.Table 3. Direct estimates of diminishing returns to schooling (OLS estimates)













St -0.00708 -0.00638 -0.00721 -0.00649 -0.00673 -0.00614
(3.23) (3.68) (3.41) (3.86) (3.18) (3.49)
(year=70) -0.02297 -0.01538 -0.02100 -0.01382 -0.02247 -0.01620
(0.81) (0.69) (0.75) (0.62) (0.85) (0.74)
(year=80) -0.03538 -0.02759 -0.03542 -0.02819 -0.03556 -0.02902
(2.49) (2.44) (2.52) (2.51) (2.55) (2.49)
(year=85) -0.04061 -0.03381 -0.04012 -0.03365 -0.04270 -0.03700
(3.06) (3.21) (3.13) (3.28) (3.30) (3.42)
Constant 0.15663 0.14513 0.15725 0.14591 0.15451 0.14490
(10.33) (11.95) (10.50) (12.07) (10.34) (11.54)
Observations 49 48 49 48 49 48
R-squared 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.39
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable is the Return to Education as in table 2. WLS
regressions are weighted by log GDP per worker or log population size. The dummy for 1975, and the dummy for
1985 in column (6), was dropped because there were no observations.Table 4. GDP growth equation










t S D 0.08546 0.17025 0.24335 0.24508 0.24717 0.24814
(4.11) (3.25) (3.84) (3.09) (3.94) (3.99)
D (St
2) -0.00780 -0.00848 -0.00881 -0.00840 -0.00898
(2.07) (2.16) (1.75) (2.18) (2.32)
t S D (year=70) -0.09705 -0.07495 -0.09901 -0.09956
(1.87) (1.34) (1.95) (1.89)
t S D (year=80) -0.06732 -0.07423 -0.07728 -0.06933
(1.35) (1.42) (1.60) (1.39)
t V D -0.00461
(0.73)
St-1 0.00297 0.00857 0.01217 0.00902 0.01231 0.01218
(4.31) (4.45) (5.42) (3.21) (5.51) (5.57)
St-1
2 -0.00045 -0.00058 -0.00034 -0.00058 -0.00059
(2.67) (3.29) (1.60) (3.36) (3.46)
St-1(year=70) -0.00349 -0.00325 -0.00386 -0.00323
(2.80) (2.39) (3.14) (2.65)
St-1(year=80) -0.00300 -0.00391 -0.00339 -0.00276
(2.63) (3.14) (3.02) (2.48)
Vt-1 0.00037
(1.03)
yt-1 -0.00616 -0.00787 -0.00839 -0.00723 -0.00848 -0.00812
(2.99) (3.74) (4.04) (2.81) (4.07) (4.08)
(year=70) 0.03449 0.03506 0.05590 0.05516 0.05769 0.05427
(10.21) (10.34) (8.17) (7.25) (8.21) (8.05)
(year=80) 0.02120 0.02179 0.04017 0.04659 0.04269 0.03832
(6.54) (6.82) (5.77) (6.12) (5.99) (5.61)
Constant 0.03816 0.04033 0.02715 0.02040 0.02735 0.02601
(2.34) (2.51) (1.67) (1.04) (1.66) (1.66)
Observations 292 292 292 250 292 292
R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37
F-statistic
1 11.29 9.56 11.08 4.65 11.27 11.29
p-value 0.0009 0.0022 0.0010 0.0321 0.0009 0.0009
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
1 H0: Long-run effect (coefficient St-1 divided by minus coefficient yt-1) equals short-run effect (coefficient
t S D ). The F-tests reject the null when the p-value is smaller than 0.05.Table 5. GDP growth equation: Dynamic panel data estimates














St 0.24335 t S D 0.21467 0.71161 0.37104 0.46365
(3.84) (2.48) (1.03) (4.26) (6.33)
St
2 -0.00848 D (St
2) -0.00744 -0.06484 -0.02025 -0.02420
(2.16) (1.31) (1.07) (4.09) (5.94)
St 
70 -0.09705 t S D
70 -0.06567 0.07700 -0.06592 -0.07970
(1.87) (0.82) (0.04) (1.12) (1.59)
St 
80 -0.06732 t S D
80 -0.05795 -0.10613 -0.02990 -0.03461
(1.35) (0.95) (0.10) (0.48) (0.66)
St-1 -0.05954 1 - D t S -0.00040 -0.31410 -0.05333 -0.12747
(1.04) (0.01) (0.32) (0.70) (2.28)
St-1
2 0.00272 D (St-1
2) 0.00002 -0.01429 0.00225 0.00778
(0.64) (0.00) (0.32) (0.41) (1.84)
St-1 
70 -0.02478 1 - D t S
70 0.00240 0.31557 -0.01259 -0.02127
(0.48) (0.04) (0.37) (0.29) (0.77)
St-1 
80 -0.06210 1 - D t S
80 -0.02123 0.31499 -0.00615 -0.01405
(1.15) (0.26) (0.17) (0.10) (0.28)
yt-1 0.91608 Dyt-1 0.11605 1.05351 0.71236 0.62961
(44.07) (1.37) (1.54) (7.62) (7.53)
(yr=70) 0.55900 -0.20276 -0.20986
(8.17) (2.87) (3.57)
(yr=80) 0.40168 (yr=80) 0.36002 0.22577 -0.59898 -0.61523
(5.77) (3.92) (0.30) (7.50) (9.50)
Const. 0.27154 Const. -0.26536 -0.64783 2.17565 2.81648
(1.67) (3.03) (1.21) (3.18) (4.73)
Obs. 292 Obs. 184 184 286 286






Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, based on robust standard errors.Table 6. GDP growth equation: the effect of measurement error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 year changes 10 year changes
(baseline model)
20 year changes 20 year changes,
Kyriacou data
t S D 0.03991 0.06276 0.08546 0.24335 0.15236 0.29273 0.13828 0.24317
(2.74) (1.12) (4.11) (3.84) (3.00) (2.52) (4.37) (2.46)
D (St
2) -0.00293 -0.00848 -0.01655 -0.00989
(1.02) (2.16) (1.77) (1.26)
t S D (year=65) 0.09728
(1.35)
t S D (year=70) -0.00882 -0.09705
(0.18) (1.87)
t S D (year=75) 0.01557
(0.28)
t S D (year=80) -0.01051 -0.06732
(0.22) (1.35)
t S D (year=85) 0.04885
(0.82)
St-1 0.00349 0.01441 0.00297 0.01217 0.00368 0.01176 0.00526 0.01074
(5.48) (6.21) (4.31) (5.42) (3.88) (4.21) (4.47) (3.15)
St-1
2 -0.00064 -0.00058 -0.00062 -0.00042











yt-1 -0.00706 -0.00913 -0.00616 -0.00839 -0.01179 -0.01306 -0.01294 -0.01354
(3.79) (4.80) (2.99) (4.04) (4.42) (4.96) (4.44) (4.61)
(year=65) 0.03189 0.05489
(7.02) (6.08)
(year=70) 0.03398 0.05876 0.03449 0.05590
(7.71) (6.62) (10.21) (8.17)
(year=75) 0.02259 0.04379
(5.22) (4.87)
(year=80) 0.01977 0.04715 0.02120 0.04017
(4.62) (5.32) (6.54) (5.77)
(year=85) -0.00457 0.00631
(1.08) (0.66)
Constant 0.04808 0.03376 0.03816 0.02715 0.09750 0.09286 0.09354 0.08605
(3.25) (2.17) (2.34) (1.67) (4.87) (4.81) (4.48) (4.06)
Observations 607 607 292 292 97 97 79 79
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.31
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Estimates in columns 1, 3 and 5 correspond to Krueger and Lindahl (2001) table 3. The results differ slightly because
we use GDP per worker rather than GDP per capita as the dependent variable.Table 7. Subsample robustness of the GDP growth equation























t S D 0.23695 0.18019 0.20674 0.22825 0.21525 0.23387
(3.34) (2.86) (2.81) (3.31) (3.26) (3.56)
D (St
2) -0.01001 -0.00981 -0.00391 -0.00653 -0.00574 -0.00696
(2.44) (2.47) (0.76) (1.47) (1.38) (1.71)
t S D (year=70) -0.07701 -0.00388 -0.11270 -0.10193 -0.10266 -0.11475
(1.30) (0.07) (1.99) (1.81) (1.94) (2.16)
t S D (year=80) -0.05366 0.00191 -0.06663 -0.06577 -0.08831 -0.07981
(0.95) (0.04) (1.20) (1.20) (1.72) (1.56)
St-1 0.00993 0.00926 0.00900 0.01131 0.01084 0.01118
(4.28) (4.11) (2.92) (4.42) (4.16) (4.71)
St-1
2 -0.00044 -0.00042 -0.00037 -0.00056 -0.00048 -0.00048
(2.50) (2.47) (1.28) (2.73) (2.46) (2.64)
St-1(year=70) -0.00284 -0.00266 -0.00161 -0.00288 -0.00359 -0.00364
(2.27) (2.17) (0.94) (1.95) (2.61) (2.75)
St-1(year=80) -0.00204 -0.00183 -0.00163 -0.00231 -0.00358 -0.00353
(1.78) (1.62) (1.11) (1.74) (2.84) (2.90)
yt-1 -0.00690 -0.00590 -0.00766 -0.00815 -0.00798 -0.00874
(3.11) (2.75) (3.40) (3.63) (3.80) (3.76)
(year=70) 0.05228 0.04693 0.05104 0.05416 0.05703 0.05828
(7.57) (6.94) (6.64) (7.36) (7.21) (7.60)
(year=80) 0.03481 0.03057 0.03589 0.03822 0.04533 0.04420
(4.92) (4.36) (4.65) (5.18) (5.60) (5.67)
Constant 0.02054 0.01657 0.02804 0.02746 0.02665 0.03153
(1.21) (1.01) (1.60) (1.58) (1.55) (1.64)
Observations 269 268 265 268 272 266
































































Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.Table 8. Income inequality


















St -0.07192 -0.08573 -0.05534 t S D -0.09820 -0.05611 -0.05718 -0.05394 -0.01934
(2.47) (3.05) (1.62) (1.40) (1.96) (2.01) (1.94) (0.77)
St
2 0.00085 0.00170 0.00365 D (St
2) 0.00320










Vt 0.00065 0.00105 -0.00070 t V D 0.00094 -0.00176 -0.00169 -0.00269 0.00065
(0.20) (0.33) (0.20) (0.13) (0.29) (0.29) (0.47) (0.13)
(yr=60) 0.11027 -0.05257 -0.00012
(0.60) (0.76) (0.00)
(yr=70) 0.13346 0.00491 -0.01062 (yr=70) -0.00801 -0.00846 -0.00835 -0.00779 -0.00474
(1.37) (0.10) (0.44) (1.49) (1.59) (1.57) (1.53) (1.03)
(yr=80) -0.06782 -0.02754 -0.03376 (yr=80) -0.00554 -0.00562 -0.00560 -0.00459 -0.00351
(0.67) (0.68) (1.79) (1.28) (1.30) (1.30) (1.11) (0.88)
1{inc} 0.09302 0.09840 0.25144 D1{inc} 0.04095 0.04155 0.04169 0.04030
(1.70) (1.81) (4.08) (3.89) (3.98) (3.89) (3.93)
1{hh} -0.04313 -0.03647 -0.00107 D1{hh} -0.00059 0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00065
(1.20) (1.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12)
1{gr} 0.26680 0.26782 0.00693 D1{gr} -0.00487 -0.00527 -0.00550 -0.00458
(6.98) (7.00) (0.13) (0.42) (0.46) (0.48) (0.42)
dumms yes
Const. 0.73888 0.76879 0.55529 Const. 0.01011 0.01056 0.01039 0.01008 0.00571
(10.48) (11.35) (5.48) (2.72) (2.90) (2.90) (2.85) (1.71)
Obs. 262 262 262 Obs. 77 77 77 77 77








Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
1 H0: Dummies for definitional changes jointly insignificant. The F-tests reject the null when the p-value is smaller than 0.05.Table 9. Subsample robustness of the inequality equation

































t S D -0.07871 -0.07214 -0.00494 -0.06751 -0.06705 -0.04840 -0.05793
(2.22) (2.00) (0.17) (1.89) (2.03) (1.71) (1.82)
t V D -0.00315 -0.00174 0.00083 -0.00717 -0.00005 -0.00095 -0.00111
(0.45) (0.26) (0.16) (0.86) (0.01) (0.16) (0.16)
(year=70) -0.00933 -0.00874 -0.00724 -0.01193 -0.00853 -0.00967 -0.00831
(1.63) (1.44) (1.57) (1.87) (1.33) (1.84) (1.36)
(year=80) -0.00487 -0.00559 -0.00423 -0.00892 -0.00661 -0.00465 -0.00548
(1.02) (1.13) (1.05) (1.82) (1.36) (1.09) (1.16)
D(def=inc) 0.04134 0.04150 0.02620 0.04344 0.04132 0.03678 0.04167
(3.88) (3.79) (2.99) (3.90) (3.34) (3.60) (3.79)
D(def=hh) -0.00038 -0.00020 0.01535 -0.00052 0.00088 0.00538 0.00028
(0.07) (0.03) (2.88) (0.08) (0.15) (0.94) (0.05)
D(def=gr.) -0.00527 -0.00516 -0.00723 -0.00419 -0.00292 -0.00624 -0.00549
(0.45) (0.43) (0.77) (0.34) (0.17) (0.56) (0.45)
Constant 0.01152 0.01121 0.00252 0.01474 0.01241 0.00909 0.01068
(2.98) (2.84) (0.73) (2.98) (2.81) (2.55) (2.61)
Obs. 69 66 61 64 64 73 70











































































Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.Figure 1. Return to education, education and inequality
A.  Diminishing returns to education
B.  Returns to education and inequality
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
BWA
KEN
CAN
CRI
DOM
SLV
GTM
HND
JAM
MEX
NIC
PAN
USA
ARG
BOL
BRA
CHL
COL
ECU PRY
PER URY
VEN
CHN
IND
IDN
ISR
KOR
MYS PAK
PHL
SGP
THA
AUT
CYP
DNK
DEU
GRC
HUN
IRL
ITA
NLD
POL
PRT
ESP
SWE
CHE
GBR
AUS
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
t
o
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
o
g
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
 
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1
.
1
1
.
2
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
CIV
CAN
CRI
DOM
GTM
HND
JAM
MEX
PAN
USA
BOL
BRA
CHL
COL
VEN
CHN
IDN
KOR
MYS PAK
PHL
SGP
THA
DNK
HUN
IRL
ITA
NLD
POL
ESP
SWE
GBR
AUS